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Abstract--In this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for & bimatrix 
game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Msxim~ Pareto sulmets are 
introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equlh'brh 
is the finite union of maximal Pareto subsets. By extending the dimension relation for maxims] Nssh 
subsets to faces of such sets, a dimension rehtion for maximal Pareto subsets is derived. Finally, 
some remarks are made on the structure of the sets of In'oper and persistent equilibria. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
John yon Neumann [1] showed that matrix games have saddle points in mixed strategies. The 
structure of the set of saddle points of a matrix game was completely described in the papers 
of Shapley and Snow [2], Bohnenblnst, Karlin and Shapley [3], and Gale and Sherman [4]. In 
the first of these papers, the extreme points of the set of saddle points are described in terms of 
square submatrices of the payoff matrix. In the last two papers, a dimension relation is derived 
for the optimal strategy sets of the two players. Furthermore, Gale and Sherman showed that 
this dimension relation, together with a condition on the number of inner faces of the optimal 
strategy sets completely characterizes the set of saddle points of a matrix game. 
For bimatrix games, Nash [5] showed the existence of equilibria in mixed strategies. Nash 
equilibria for matrix games exactly correspond to saddle points. By considering mazimal Nash 
subsets--a term introduced by Heuer and Millham [6J---some of the results for matrix games could 
be generalized to bimatrix games. Vorobev [7], Kuhn [8], Jansen [9] and Jurg and Jansen [10] 
characterized extreme points of maximal Nash subsets in terms of square submatrices of the 
payoff matrices. It appeared that the set of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game is the finite 
union of maximal Nash subsets (cf. [9,11]). Further, Jansen [9] derived a dimension relation for 
maximal Nash subsets. 
Recently Borm, Jansen, Potters and Tijs [12] showed that the structure of the set of perfect 
equilibria [13] of a bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of Nash equilibria. Introducing 
mazimal Selten subsets in analogy to maximal Nash subsets, it was found that the set of perfect 
equilibria is the finite union of maximal Selten subsets. Moreover, maximal Selten subsets atisfy 
the same dimension relation which was found for maximal Nash subsets. Jansen, Jurg and 
Borm [14] indicated that analogous results hold for the set of strictly perfect equilibria [15]. 
This paper considers a further subclass of equilibria with the same nice structure. A Nash 
equilibrium is called a Pareto equilibrium if there is no other equilibrium yielding at least the 
same payoff for each player, and a higher payoff or at least one of them. For bimatrix games, 
mazimal Pareto subsets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found 
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that the set of Pareto equilibria is the union of the finite number of maximal Pareto subsets. 
Further, it is proved that the dimension relation for maximal Nash subsets can be extended to 
faces of such sets. In this way, we obtain a dimension relation for maximal Pareto subsets. 
Finally, we illustrate that, for bimstrix games, the set of proper equilibria [16] and the set of 
persistent equilibria [17] need not have the structure described above. 
NOTATION. N := {1, 2,. . .  ) is the set of positive integers. R t is the vector space of t-tuples of 
real numbers and At := {p E R t [ p ~ 0, ~-~=1 Pi = I). The unit vectors in R t are denoted by 
e l ,e2, . . .  ,et and e := ~_~=le~. For S C R t we denote by conv(S) the convex hull of S. For a 
convex set C C R t we denote by relint(C) the relative interior of C and by dim(C) the dimension 
of C. 
2. THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM SET 
Let A and B be two m × n matrices. The m × n bimatriz game (A,B) is defined as the 
two-person game, in strategic form, where Player 1 and Player 2 independently choose (mixed) 
strategies p E Am and q E An, respectively, and obtain a payoff of p A q and p B q accordingly. 
A pair of strategies (1~,£1) E Am x An is called a Nasa equilibrium of (A,B)  i f~A£1 ~ pA£1 
and I~B£1 ~ l~Bq for all p E Am, q E An. In other words, unilateral deviation from an 
equilibrium does not pay. 
For a strategy p E Am we denote by C(p) := {i E {1, . . . ,m)  [p~ > 0} the carrier of p, by 
PB2(p) := ( j  E {1, . . . ,n)  [pBe j  = maxkE{1 ..... n}pBek} the pure best answers of Playor 2 to 
p and by B~(p) := conv(PB2(p)) the best answers of Player 2 to p. For q E An, C(q), PBI(q) 
and B1 (q) are defined analogously. 
It is easy to check that a strategy pair (p, q) E Am × An is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
C(p) C PBl(q)  and C(q) C PB2(p). 
Nash [5] showed that the set E(A, B) of Nash equilibria of (A, B) is non-empty for all games 
(A, B). Jansen [9] showed that E(A, B) is the finite union of maximal Nseh subsets, where 
T C E(A, B) is a Nasa subset if there are sets T1 C A,n and T2 C An such that T = 7"1 x 
T2. A Nash subset T is called mazimal if it is not properly contained in another Nash subset. 
Moreover, Jansen proved that each maximal Nash subset is the Cartesian product of two convex 
polytopes and for each of these polytopes a dimension relation was formulated. Furthermore, a 
characterization f the ez'treme quilibria (being the extreme points of the maximal Nasa subsets) 
was provided by Vorobev [7], Kuhn [8], Jansen [9] and Jurg and Jansen [10]. 
3. PARETO EQUILIBRIA 
In this section, we consider the set of Pareto equilibria. It turns out that the structure of this 
clam of equilibria resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) equilibria. 
For a bimatrix game, an equilibrium is called Pareto or payoff undominatcd if there is no 
equilibrium with at least the same payoff or both players and a higher payoff or at least one of 
the players. The set of all Pareto equilibria of a bimatrix game (A, B) is denoted by PAR(A, B). 
Now we introduce the following definition. 
DEFINITION. Let  (A, B) be an m x n bimatrix game and let S be a non-empty subset of 
PAR(A,B). The set S is called a Pareto subset if there are sets $1 C Am and 52 C An such that 
S = Sl × S~. A Pareto subset is called mazimal if it is not properly contained in another Pareto 
subset. 
We will prove that maximal Pareto subsets play a similar role in the set of Pareto equilibria 
as maximal Nash (or Selten) subsets do in the set of Nash (or perfect) equilibria. First of all, we 
prove in Lemma 2 that the set of equilibria within a maximal Nash si~bset T = T1 × T~, for which 
both the payoff to Player 1 and the payoff to Player 2 attain their maximal value, is non-empty 
and that this set is, in fact, the Cartesian product of faces OfT1 and T2. First, we need a result 
of Jansen, Jurg and Borm [14]. 
LI~MMA 1. Let F be a face of a maximal Nasa subset and let (~, ~1) E relint(F). Then (p, q) E F 
ffand only/t'C(p) C C(~), PB2(p) D PB~(~), C(q) C C(~l) and PBI(q) D PBI(~t). 
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Consequently, if F = FI x F2 is a face of some maximal Nash subset, then the sets C(FI) := 
C(~), C(F2) := C(~l), PB2(FI) := PB2(~) and PBI(F2) := PBI(~i) do not depend on the choice 
of the point (l~, ~I) • relint(F). These sets play a role in the proof of the next lemma. 
LEMMA 2. Let (A, B) be an m × n b/matrix game and let T = TI x T~ be a max/ms/Nash subset 
for (A, B). Let PAP~(A,B) be the set of equilibria in T where the payoff to Player 1, as well as 
the payoff to Player 2, attains its maximum on T. Then PAR~,(A, B) is the Cartesian product 
of non-empty faces of T1 and T2. 
PROOF. Take i • PBI(T~) and j • PB2(T1). Then, for every equilibrium (p,q) • T we have 
pAq=esAq and pBq=pBe j .  
If we define g:T1 --* ~ by g(p) = pBe j  and h:T2 ---* R by h(q) = e iAq ,  then PART(A,B) = 
]>1 × P2, where Px C T1 and P2 C T~ are given by 
PI = {D e T1 I g(D) >_ g(p) for all p • T1} and 
]>2 = {q • T~ I h(~) >_ h(q) for all q • T2}. 
By linearity of g and h, this means that />I and P2 are non-empty faces of TI and T~, 
respectively. II 
From Lemma 2 and the fact that there are only a finite number of maximal Nash subsets, we 
infer that there exists at least one Pareto equilibrium. By definition, each maximal Pareto subset 
P is a Nash subset and is, therefore, contained in a maximal Nash subset T. Obviously, if a 
maximal Nash subset T contains Pareto equilibria, then PAR(A,  B) f3 T = PART(A,  B). Hence, 
we find the following result. 
THEOREM 1. Let (A, B) be a bimatrixgame. Then PAR(A, B) is the finite union of the max/ms/ 
Pareto subsets. ~rthermore, ach maxims/Nash subset contains, at most, one maxims/Pareto 
subset and a maximal Pareto subset is a face of every maxims/Nash subset in which it is 
contained. 
Theorem 1 directly implies the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 1. For any bimatrix game, each extreme point of some max/ms/Pareto subset is 
an extreme quilibrium. 
Hence, in determining the set of Pareto equilibria, one can first trace all extreme quilibria 
(e.g., by using one of the characterizations mentioned in Section 2) and then find out which of 
these extreme quilibria are Pareto. So, at least theoretically, one can compute the set of Pareto 
equilibria in a systematic way. 
Two different maximal Pareto subsets may have a non-empty intersection, as the following 
example shows. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let the 3 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
(A, B) = I 
(0,0) (2,1) (0,0)] 
(2, 2) (0,2) (0,0) l. 
(2, 2) (0,2) (2, 2) J 
This game has three maximal Nash subsets 
T = 
1 1 
: (e., ¢on.{e,, e,, 
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It then follows that 
PART(A,  B) = {(el, e2)}, 
PART. (A, B) = cony{e2, es} x {el}, 
PART** (A, B) = {es} x conv{el,es}, 
From these facts, we find that the game (A, B) has 
PART. (A, B) and P** := PART*-(A, B) with 
payoff vector(2,1), 
payoff vector(2,2), 
payoff vector(2,2). 
two maximal Pareto subsets P* := 
P* NP**  = {(es ,e l )}~.  
REMARK. Note that for the bimatrix game introduced in the foregoing example, the set of 
equilibria for which there exists no strategy pair, with at least the same payoff or each player 
and a higher payoff or at least one of the players, is the union of the two maximal Pareto subsets 
P* and P**. One can also easily show that, in general, the set of equilibria with this property, if
non-empty, is the union of some of the maximal Pareto subsets. 
The next example shows that the multifunction which assigns to a bimatrix game the set of 
Pareto equilibria is neither upper semicontinuous nor lower semicontinuous. 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the sequence {(A~, Bk)}keN of 2 x 1 bimatrix games given by 
(Ak,B ) = [ (1+ ~,0)] , (A,B) = 02t] (1,2) [(1, L(I, 
We find that PAR(Ak ,Bt )  = {(e2,el)} for all k EI~I and PAR(A ,B)  = {(el,el)}. 
Finally, we extend the dimension relation as given by Jansen [9] to the faces of a maximal 
Nash subset. In view of Theorem 1, such an extension leads to a dimension relation for maximal 
Pareto subsets. In view of Lemma 1, we can define, for a bimatrix game (A, B), the submatrices 
A(F2) := [aij]iePB,(F~),jeC(F2) and B(F1) := [bij]ieC(Fl),jePB~(Fl) 
of A and B, respectively. Now we can formulate the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Let (A, B) be an m × n bimatrix game with A > 0 and B > O. Let F = F1 x F2 
be a face of  a maximal Nash subset. Then 
dim(F1) - IC(FI)I - rank B(F1) and dim(F2) = ]C(F2)[- rank A(F~). 
PROOF. We only prove the assertion for F1. Let I~ E relint(Fl). Continuity arguments imply 
that we can choose an open neighbourhood U C Am of i ~ such that, for all p E U, 
C(p) D C(~) and PB2(p) C PB2(~) .  
Further, let the vector space V C •m be given by 
V := x E ]R m x~ = 0, zi = 0 for all i ~ C(FI) and xF1 B(F1) = ~e for some/~ E ]~ , 
i----1 
where XFI is the restriction of x to ~C(FI). 
(a) First, we determine the dimension of the vector space V. Using the fact that B > 
0, C(~) = C(FI) and PB2(~) = PB2(FI), it is found that I~FIB(F1) =/~e, for some/~ > 
0. Therefore, 
dim({x E ~m I z ~ = 0 for all i ~ C(F1) and xF~ B(FI) --/~e, for some/~ e ]R}) 
= 1 + d im({x  E A m I z ,  = 0 for all i ~ C(F1) and xF~ B(F1) -- 0}) 
= 1 + dim({z e IR c(F~) I z B(FI) = 0}) = 1 + lC(FI)I - rank B(FI). 
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Hence, since b ¢ V (~'~1Pi # 0), 
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dim(V) = IC(F1)I- rank B(&). 
(b) Finally, we show that dim(F1) = dim(V) by proving that 
((b + v) n u) c FI c (b + v). 
Let p E F1. By Lemma 1, we have C(p) C C(I~) = C(Fx) and PB~(p) D PB~(fJ) = 
PB~(F1). Hence, p-f> E V. Now let p E (fJ+V)NU. Since p E U, we have C(p) D C(FI) 
and PB~(p) C PB~(F1). Consequently, p -  ~ E V implies that C(p) - C(F1) and 
PB2(p) = PB2(F1). So, by Lemma 1, p E F1. I 
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we have the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 2. Let P = P1 x P2 be a maximal Pareto subset for a bimatrix game (A, B) with 
A > O and B > O. Then 
dim(P1) = IC(Px)[ - rank B(P1) and dim(P2) = [C(P2)I - rank A(Pa). 
4. SOME OTHER REF INEMENTS 
From Section 3 and the paper of Borm, Jansen, Potters and Tijs [12] it can be concluded that 
the nice structure of the set of Pareto (or perfect) equilibria of a bimatrix game is due to the 
fact that these sets are the finite union of faces of maximal Nash subsets. Now we illustrate that 
a similar argument cannot be used in describing the set of proper equilibria [16] and the set of 
persistent equilibria [17]. 
EXAMPLE 3. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
(1,8) (2,2) (1,6)] 
(A ,B)= (2, 2) (1, 8) (1, 6) " 
Then E(A, B) - cony { 1 2 e 1 el + S 2, } el + S e2 } x {ea}. All equilibria of (A, B) are perfect, while 
(½el + ½e2, ea) is the unique proper equilibrium of (A,B). 
Stimulated by the results we obtained for Paxeto (or perfect) equilibria, one might be tempted 
to call M = M1 x M2 := {½el + lea} x {es} a maximal Myerson subset. Then, however, the 
following conclusions can be made. 
(i) A maximal Myerson subset need not be the face of a maximal Nash subset. In particular, 
this implies that an extreme lement of a maximal Myerson subset need not be an extreme 
equilibrium. 
(ii) There is no dimension relation in the sense of Corollary 2. For 
O = dim( gx ) ~ IC( M1)l - rank B( M1) : 2 - rank [ ~ ] -1 ,  
while [1] 
0 m dim(M2) m IC(g2)l - rank A(Ma) = 1 - rank 1 = 0. 
Example 3 shows that the set of proper equilibria need not be the finite union of faces of 
maximal Nash subsets. However, Jansen [18] showed that the set of proper equilibria of a bimatrix 
game is the finite union of polytopes. 
Finally, we concentrate on persistent equilibria. For an m x n bimatrix game (A, B) a closed 
and convex set R = R1 x R2 C Am x An is called an absorbing retract if there exists an 
open neighbourhood V of R, such that for all (p, q) E V there exist a pair (I3, ~1) E R, such 
that 13 E Bl(q) and ~1 E B2(p). An absorbing retract hat does not properly contain another 
24 P.E.M. BORM et a/. 
absorbing retract is called a persistent retract. Kalai and Samet [17] showed that every bimatrix 
game possesses a persistent retract and that every persistent retract contains an equilibrium. 
Such an equilibrium is called a persisteat eq~ilil~riam. The following example shows that the set 
of persistent equilibria of a bimatrix game need not be closed. 
EXAMPLe. 4. Let the 2 x 3 bimatrix game (A, B) be given by 
(0,0) 
L(O,2) (1,2) (0,0) " 
Then 
× cony  + cony  + × + 
u ~e~+~e~ ×cony ge~+ge~,  e~+~e~ .
It is straightforward to verify that the set {(e~,e3)) and each of the sets {(e2,q)) with q 
conv{e~,e~}, such that e~ Aq  > e~ Aq,  are absorbing and hence, persistent. We show that 
there are no other persistent retracts. Let R = R] × R2 be a persistent retract. Assume p K R~. 
If pl > ~, then B2(p) - {e~} and so e3 ~ R~. Since Bl(e~) = {e~}, it follows that el  ~ R~. 
Hence, R = {(e~, ea)}. 
If p~ = 1, then B~ ((-~ -!- e) e~ + (~ - e) e2) = {e~} for smail e > 0. So e3 ~ R2 and, as in the 
foregoing case, R - {(el, es)}. 
I fp~ < ½, then there is a q ~ conv{ex,e2} N R~. In case e~Aq > e2Aq,  it follows that 
el  ~ R1 and consequently e~ ~ R~. Hence, R -- {(e~,es)}. In case e lAq  < e2Aq,  we have 
1 e2 K R~ and R-  {(e2,q)}. In casee~Aq = e2Aq,  it follows that q = ~e~-I -~e~. Now 
BI ( (½ +e)e~ + (~-e)e~)  -- (e~} forsmall  e > 0. Soe~ ~ R~ and R= {(e~,e~)}. 
Hence, the set of persistent equilibria of (A, B) is given by 
{ (e~,ea)}U{e2}×fqKAa lq3=0andq2>~-  t .
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